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The Supreme Court has decided that an agreement between defendants and
potential defendants can deprive a plaintiff of a Congressionally authorized cause
of action, forcing plaintiffs instead into labor arbitration that a plaintiff never
chose, does not want, cannot influence, and, on the facts of the case, will never
take place anyway.' A collective bargaining agreement in which a union and
employer agree to arbitrate claims of discrimination will now serve, at least some
of the time, to require courts to dismiss discrimination claims made by employees
who are not party to that agreement and cannot enforce the agreement, or, now,
their individual statutory rights.
It is likely that the Court anticipated this ruling would divert many
discrimination claims from federal court to labor arbitration. This Article argues
that, if this was the hope, it will be disappointed. Hereafter, employees
represented by labor unions, who believe they are victims of discrimination, will
be in federal court twice. The first round will come before arbitration, when the
employee sues the employer. The employer will move to dismiss the claim on the
grounds that the employee's claim should have been arbitrated by the union.
Many of these motions to dismiss will be granted, following Pyett. Other motions
will raise difficult questions of judicial interpretation of the arbitration clause in a
collective bargaining agreement, in which Pyett is in considerable tension with
precedent on judicial interpretation of arbitration clauses. These difficult motions
to dismiss will predictably generate numerous conflicts among lower courts, and
some have already appeared. 2 In addition to these interpretive problems, there
will be cases in which the arbitration clause clearly covers the employee's case,
* Professor and Sidney Reitman Scholar, Rutgers University School of Law, Newark,
New Jersey. Karl Klare and Jim Pope were their invariably helpful selves. Thank you to
Samuel Davenport, whose paper on Pyett contributed to this Article.
1 14 Penn Plaza LLC. v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
2 See infra note 105, note 142, and note 152.
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but in which it will appear to be a "waste of time," to send the employee to labor
arbitration.
The second round of appearances in federal court will occur after the
employee (as expected) loses the arbitration, which is why the employee sued in
the first place. After the labor arbitrator rules in favor of the employer, the
employee will return to federal court, alleging both discrimination by the
employer and a denial of fair representation by the union. The adverse arbitration
ruling will, in this context, be offered as further evidence of the employer's
discrimination and union's denial of fair representation. I will show below that
current legal standards for evaluating these claims, already vague and
controversial, will prove inadequate for resolving the new post-Pyett generation
of statutory rulings by labor arbitrators.
Pyett reverses a previously unbroken line of precedent, keeping employees'
rights under collective bargaining agreements separate from their rights under
state and federal statutes and common law. The Court has now equated the two
rights without explaining by what alchemy individual rights under federal law
transform into a union claim against an employer under a collective bargaining
agreement. Under a broad, though plausible, reading of Pyett, employees
represented by unions now have literally no employment rights under state or
federal law, except the rights that unions choose to arbitrate. This creates a
significant disincentive to representation by labor unions. Under any reading,
however, Pyett will now lead to a lengthy future chain of cases to determine: (1)
which employee legal claims may be stripped by collective agreements and sent
to arbitration,; (2) whether particular language in collective bargaining
agreements will be needed to strip employees of statutory rights; (3) which
demands (if any) to waive claims will constitute demands for individual
bargaining, hence bargaining in bad faith; (4) whether other dispute resolution
institutions might substitute for arbitration; (5) whether standards for fair
representation need to be revised if unions are representing employee statutory
claims; and (6) whether the role of courts changes when reviewing arbitration
awards that deal with statutory rights. This Article will discuss these issues.
Stephen Pyett's age discrimination claim has been kicking around since
2003, and now will never be tried or arbitrated. In Pyett's account, he has been
employed since 1970 continuously at the office building 14 Penn Plaza in
various positions. Pyett was initially employed by the building owners, and after
1982, by a maintenance contractor. 3 From 1989 to 2003, Pyett was a night
3 Employment of janitors and security guards by contractors rather than building owners
is directly related to low wages and benefits. Arindrajit Dube & Ethan Kaplan, Does
Outsourcing Reduce Wages in the Low- Wage Service Occupations? Evidence from Janitors
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watchman employed by the maintenance contractor. In 2003, a security company
which Pyett claims is an affiliate or subsidiary of the maintenance contractor was
hired.4 Pyett soon found himself transferred to the less desirable and less
remunerative position of night porter, while his formerjob went to an employee
of the security company both younger and with less seniority. Pyett and two
fellow employees with similar experiences sued the building company and
maintenance contractor alleging age discrimination.5
Pyett's case was never tried due to the employer's claim that its arbitration
agreement with Pyett's union stripped Pyett of his statutory right to litigate.6
Pyett, in fact, had taken his discrimination claim to the union, but the union,
having agreed to the hiring of the security company, felt that it could not
complain about the impact on Pyett.7
The employers moved to dismiss Pyett's discrimination case on the grounds
that the arbitration clause in Pyett's collective bargaining agreement deprived the
court ofjurisdiction.8 The district court and court of appeals denied this motion,
but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that it should have been granted. The
result is that Pyett's age discrimination case will never be heard. A labor
arbitrator cannot hear it unless the union pursues it, which the union refuses to
do. Now no court can hear it either.
14 Penn Plaza and the contractors did not argue that Pyett signed any
agreement to arbitrate his discrimination (or any other) claims, or in any way
gave individual consent to arbitrate rather than sue.9 Rather, they argued, and the
and Guards (UC Berkeley: Inst. for Research on Labor & Emp., Working Paper No. 171-08,
2008), available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6s89498v. Janitors and guards employed
by contractors earn less with fewer benefits than similar janitors and guards employed
directly by the ultimate recipient of their services. Id. The employees of contractors are also
more likely to be female, African-American, or Latino. Id.
4 Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35952 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2006),





8 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1461-62.
9 Agreements between individual employees and their employers to arbitrate disputes
are presumptively enforceable as a matter of federal law. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
532 U.S. 105 (2001) (individual agreement to arbitrate is covered by Federal Arbitration
Act); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (individual agreement to
arbitrate federal discrimination claim is enforceable); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987)
(individual agreement to arbitrate wage claims arises under Federal Arbitration Act and
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Court held, that a collective bargaining agreement between Pyett's union and
employer, where the union and employer agreed to arbitrate the union 's disputes
arising under that collective bargaining agreement, deprived Pyett of the age
discrimination suit that Congress provided him.10 Pyett was thus stripped of his
discrimination suit twice: first, when his union and employer agreed, for their
own purposes, to take it from him; and second, in his individual case, when his
union refused to take his discrimination claim to arbitration.
The Supreme Court decided this precise question in Pyett's favor a
generation ago. It permitted an employee to litigate a discrimination case despite
an adverse ruling by the arbitrator under the collective bargaining agreement
finding him to have been discharged for cause.II Congress expressly approved
this decision in enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990 and the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.12 The Supreme Court did not technically overrule
preempts state law purportedly forbidding waivers of suit). However, Pyett signed no such
individual agreement.
10 Both the building and the maintenance company have allegedly signed the collective
bargaining agreement. Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35952, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
June 1, 2006), affd 498 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129
S. Ct. 1456, (2009.
11 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974). Alexander was a
weaker case for the employee than Pyett's. Alexander had actually submitted his
discrimination claim to labor arbitration between his union and employer, and that
arbitrator had determined that Alexander has been dismissed for cause. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court held unanimously that Alexander retained his right to sue the employer
under Title VII. The arbitrator's ruling adverse to Alexander was not preclusive. It was
admissible "as evidence and entitled to such weight as the court deems appropriate" but
did not preclude that court's obligation to consider the discrimination case de novo.
In Pyett's case, by contrast, the union refused to submit his discrimination case to
arbitration. Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co. 498 F.3d 88, 91 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd, 14 Penn Plaza LLC
v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, (2009.
12 Each of those acts contains language expressing support for alternative dispute
resolution without compelling its use. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) § 513, 42
U.S.C. § 12212; Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 118, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Congress explained
those provisions in the same language; for brevity I quote only the report on the ADA:
[T]he Committee believes that any agreement to submit disputed issues to
arbitration, whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an
employment contract, does not preclude the affected person from seeking relief under
the enforcement provisions of this Act .. .The Committee believes that the approach
articulated by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver applies equally to
the ADA....
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 76-77 (1990)(emphasis added). See generally Joseph R.
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Alexander in deciding Pyett, since the recent case ordered dismissal of the
discrimination suit, rather than determining the status of an earlier arbitration
award in an ongoing discrimination suit. However, the Supreme Court stated its
willingness to overrule Alexander should the occasion arise.13 As mentioned, the
occasion to overrule Alexander will arise soon enough. When an employee loses
in arbitration, returns to federal court alleging that the employer's ongoing
discrimination and union's denial of fair representation, deprive the arbitrator's
ruling of finality; the Court will then overrule Alexander and hold that the
discrimination case may not proceed de novo. The Court will then face the issue,
on which it will divide sharply, of how to evaluate the employee's claim of
discrimination and unfair representation in light of the adverse arbitration.
II. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice Thomas began by setting forward
the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement between Pyett's
employer and Pyett's union. 14 The agreement provided for arbitration between
the union and the employer, and expressly covered employee claims of
discrimination.15 Since 1947, collective bargaining agreements in private
employment have been enforceable contracts in federal court, 16 governed
Grodin, Arbitration ofEmployment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the Wake
of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 30-35 (1996). Pyett's suit by contrast arises under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), a 1967 statute that contains no language
encouraging alternative dispute resolution. The absence of any reference to alternative
dispute resolution in the ADEA did not prevent the Court from inserting it. The Court quoted
the above language from the ADA and Civil Rights Acts as if they applied to the ADEA,
which they do not.
13 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1469 n.8 (2009) ("strong candidate for
overruling").
14 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act added Section 301 to the
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006), creating federal
jurisdiction for suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements.
15 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52-53 (1974). ("[A] contractual
right to submit a claim to arbitration is not displaced simply because Congress also has
provided a statutory right against discrimination. Both rights have legally independent
origins and are equally available to the aggrieved employee").
16 The Labor Management Relations Act was enacted in 1947. See LMRA, 29 U.S.C.
185 (2006).
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ultimately by federal common law, which favors arbitration of differences
between unions and employers, for whom they "substitute for industrial strife."17
The sole question presented by Pyett was whether to overrule the Court's
previous holding and Congress' express direction that such collective
agreements, however binding on unions and employers for the resolution of their
disputes, do not extinguish individual employees' rights to sue in court to redress
discrimination.18 Justice Thomas, en route to the decision, made numerous
assertions about the collective bargaining agreement I believe irrelevant to the
case before him, in some cases undisputed (but in others novel, and likely to
produce litigation). The following list shows my tally of Justice Thomas's
irrelevant, or false reasoning:
* The union had broad authority over contract negotiation, subject to a
duty of fair representation owed to employees that it represents.' 9
* The employer had a duty to bargain in good faith with the union.20
* In this case, the employer and union had bargained in good faith.21
* The subjects of an arbitration clause are mandatory subjects of
bargaining.22
17 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578 (1960).
18 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1461 (2009).
19 Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1463 (citing Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964)).
Undisputed and irrelevant. The case raised no issue of whether the negotiation of a clause
requiring arbitration between the union and employer of their disputes denied fair
representation.
20 Id. (citing National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5)). Undisputed
and irrelevant. The outcome of the case does not depend on whether the subject of
arbitration concerned a mandatory or permissive subject of bargaining.
21 Id. at 1464. Obviously the Court does not know how the negotiations proceeded. It
would be accurate, though irrelevant, to observe that neither the union nor the employer
complained about the other's bargaining. The issue was the effect of that bargain on
individual employees' statutory rights, not the relationship between the union and employer.
22 Id. Dubious at this level of generality. Employer demands to exclude permissive
subjects from arbitration clauses are themselves permissive subjects of bargaining, unless the
Court means to overrule First Nat'l. Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (employer
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* "Respondents, however, contend that the arbitration clause here is
outside the permissible scope of the collective-bargaining process
because it affects the employees' individual, non-economic statutory
rights." 23
* "[T]here is no legal basis for the Court to strike down the arbitration
clause in this CBA.... "24
* "Congress has chosen to allow arbitration of ADEA claims." 25
After eleven pages of this obiter, the Court got down to the task at hand,
eviscerating Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Corp., which held that an individual
might pursue discrimination claims in court despite the finding by an arbitrator,
to whom the discrimination claim had been submitted by the union, that he was
discharged for cause. 26
The Court first attempted to distinguish Alexander on its facts. Alexander
rested on "the narrow ground that arbitration was not preclusive because the
collective bargaining agreement did not cover statutory claims."27 This statement
is false on two grounds. First, it is false as to the facts of Alexander's collective
23 Id. at 1464. Totally false. No one has suggested that unions and employers are legally
constrained from arbitrating any matter in dispute between them. Thus no one suggested that
the arbitration clause in Pyett was improper, or outside the permissible scope of bargaining.
For example, neither employer nor union had asserted that the other had violated the
statutory duty to bargain in good faith, NLRA Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3). The issue was
whether the results of such arbitration, or the bare existence of the clause, could affect rights
of individuals not party to the contract.
24 Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1466. True but irrelevant. No one asked the Court to "strike
down" any clause in any collectively bargained agreement. The clause is perfectly fine and
binding as between the parties that signed it, namely the employer and the union. Federal
courts have no general power to "strike down" clauses in collective bargaining agreements,
and Justice Thomas's suggestion and loose language to the contrary will cause great mischief
in the future.
25 Id. at 1466. Totally false. The ADEA is completely silent on arbitration. The Court
held in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), that claims under the
ADEA might be arbitrated when individuals "agreed" to do so (the contract was actually
Gilmer's form registration as a securities representative). It is accurate to state that ADEA
claims may be arbitrated but false to assert that Congress has said anything about this. The
Court's textualism without a text has been searchingly criticized in Margaret L. Moses, The
Pretext of Textualism: Disregarding Stare Decisis in 14 Penn Plaza v Pyett, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 825 (2010). Unlike Gilmer, Pyett never agreed to arbitrate anything.
26 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 45 U.S. 36 (1974).
27 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1467.
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bargaining agreement, which did cover statutory claims; and second, it is false as
to the Court's holding in Alexander.28
The arbitration clause in the CBA at issue in Alexander covered the
employee's discrimination claim against his employer, which is why the
arbitrator decided whether Alexander had been discharged for discriminatory or
valid reasons. This ruling by the arbitrator was unsurprising. The Court had long
held, before the Pyett decision, that federal collective bargaining law employs a
heavy "presumption of arbitrability." 29 Under this presumption, an arbitration
clause covers any dispute plausibly within its scope, including any dispute over
which the union cannot strike, such as claims by individual employees. 30 It has
28 As summarized by the Alexander Court, 415 U.S. at 39-42 (footnotes omitted)
(Under Art. 4 of the collective-bargaining agreement, the company retained "the right to hire,
suspend or discharge [employees] for proper cause." Article 5, § 2, provided, however, that
"there shall be no discrimination against any employee on account of race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, or ancestry," and Art. 23, § 6 (a), stated that "no employee will be
discharged, suspended or given a written warning notice except for just cause." The
agreement also contained a broad arbitration clause covering "differences aris[ing] between
the Company and the Union as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this
Agreement" and "any trouble aris[ing] in the plant." Disputes were to be submitted to a
multi-step grievance procedure, the first four steps of which involved negotiations between
the company and the union. If the dispute remained unresolved, it was to be remitted to
compulsory arbitration. The company and the union were to select and pay the arbitrator, and
his decision was to be "final and binding upon the Company, the Union, and any employee
or employees involved." The agreement further provided that "the arbitrator shall not amend,
take away, add to, or change any of the provisions of this Agreement, and the arbitrator's
decision must be based solely upon an interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement."
The parties also agreed that there "shall be no suspension of work" over disputes covered by
the grievance-arbitration clause.)
29 AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'n Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) ("[W]here the
contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that
'[an] order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said
with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that
covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.") (quoting
United Steel Workers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960))).
30 United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960)
("There is no exception in the 'no strike' clause and none therefore should be read into the
grievance clause, since one is the quid pro quo for the other."); Warrior & Gulf 363 U.S. at
581 ("Apart from matters that the parties specifically exclude, all of the questions on which
the parties disagree must therefore come within the scope of the grievance and arbitration
provisions .. . "); Id. at 584-85 ("In the absence of any express provision excluding a
particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose
to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail. . . "); AT&T Techs., 475 U.S. at 652
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never been part of federal labor law to scrutinize closely the language of
ambiguous arbitration clauses, since they are presumed to cover all disputes
between employers and unions, except those expressly excluded. "Doubts should
be resolved in favor of coverage." 31
Pyett will have mischievous results if it upends this established practice of
broadly interpreting arbitration clauses; especially if offered solely as a specious
distinction with a precedent which the Court has tired and would prefer to
overrule. I am confident, however, that Pyett will have just this effect on lower
court practice. Suits to compel arbitration, not just motions to dismiss individual
claims pending arbitration, will send district courts into closely parsing
arbitration clauses in order to determine whether they include the dispute in
question (similar to the clause in Pyett) or do not cover it (as the clause in
Alexander is now retrospectively, and falsely, characterized). I will return to
these implications of Pyett in Part IV.A, when I address more specifically the
problems it will create.
H1. CRITIQUE OF PYETT: THE FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND THE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS AND UNION CLAIMS
Pyett's infidelity to precedent is important in a practical, not just pedantic,
sense. As Part IV will show, an enormous number of practical problems will
bedevil federal courts over the next few years trying to reconcile Pyett with
precedent on the interpretation of arbitration clauses and the review of
arbitrators' awards. In order to understand this, it is necessary to discuss in more
depth the fundamental conflicts.
The modem employment relationship, to invoke a trite metaphor, is a bundle
of sticks. Employees have numerous legal claims on employers, with diverse
origins, including individual contracts, collective bargaining agreements, state
and federal statutes, and state common law.
The bright-line Alexander rule was that claims arising from collective
bargaining agreements must normally be submitted to dispute resolution
institutions created by those collective bargaining agreements, which usually was
arbitration. All other claims were held by employees as individuals, and were
enforced through administrative or litigation mechanisms contemplated by state
or federal legislation.
As we shall see, this rule was easy to administer, and generated no difficulty
or confusion. No good reason has been suggested for departing from it. Pyett
("express exclusion or other forceful evidence").
31 Warrior & GulfNavigation Co., 363 U.S. at 583.
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should have applied directly controlling precedent and maintained the historic
distinction between the union's legal claims and the union member's legal
claims. Before examining just how much law has been upset by Pyett, it is
necessary to review the evolution of collective bargaining law up to 2009,
specifically the evolution of the bright line between union claims and member
claims. The argument proceeds in four parts.
First, collective bargaining arbitration was granted its legal privileges as a
preferred way of resolving disputes between unions and employers, expressly not
as a substitute for litigation.
Second, the Court, on at least eleven separate occasions before Pyett,
reaffirmed that employees represented by unions nevertheless retain statutory,
contractual, and other common law rights. Moreover, these rights are to be
resolved individually and are not subject to binding results in labor arbitration,
unless the employee chooses to submit them. These cases, taken together,
establish what we are calling the bright line rule under where each employee's
legal claim against an employer is enforced through its own mechanism. The
Court in Pyett discusses few of them and thus immediately casts doubt on at least
eleven Supreme Court labor cases and their countless applications by lower
courts.
Third, labor arbitration has evolved as an institution in response to these two
precise parameters. It worked efficiently to resolve disputes between unions and
employers. However, it has historically contributed nothing of value to the
resolution of statutory or common law claims by individual employees against
employers. There is no reason to think that labor arbitration can suddenly turn
into a kind of labor court, or master labor institution to resolve statutory and
common law claims beyond its competence or experience. 32
Fourth, requiring arbitration in Pyett will create pressure to eliminate other
lawsuits that Congress clearly intended to regulate overreaching unions and
employers. For example, the labor titles of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 33 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990,34 will essentially become dead letters for unionized employees if they
cannot sue on their claims, but are instead forced against their will by decision of
their employers and unions to submit them to collective bargaining arbitration.
Similarly, labor law decisions on arbitration have always been taken to apply to
other institutions resolving disputes under collective bargaining agreements, such
32 See infra Part I.E.
33 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
34 42 U.S.C.§§ 12101-12213(2006).
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as joint grievance committees under Teamster contracts.35 These committees are
particularly poorly suited to resolve individual statutory claims.36
Thus, the Supreme Court's apparent decision to abandon the Alexander
bright line rule will launch the Court into a new lengthy line of cases to
determine exactly which statutory claims may be appropriated by collective
bargaining agreements. The Court should not operate under the illusion that
reversing Alexander will rid its docket of discrimination claims by workers
represented by unions. On the contrary, Pyett opens an enormous list of cases,
each presenting different versions of the defense that the presence of a collective
bargaining agreement extinguishes the employee's claim.
A. The Relationship Between Arbitration Under Collective Bargaining
Agreements, a "Substitute for Industrial Strife, "37 and Rights
Under Collective Bargaining Agreements
The opinion of the Court in Pyett relies on a unitary concept called
"arbitration." Under this concept, all kinds of arbitration are more or less
fungible devices for private resolution of disputes, all of which substitute for
litigation. This view of the world originates in 1991, when the Court in Gilmer
enforced an individual contract in which an individual securities representative
agreed38 to arbitrate disputes with his employer.39 Having decided Gilmer, the
Court in Pyett held it was obligated to treat arbitration clauses in collective
bargaining agreements as waivers of employees' right to sue under the same Age
Discrimination in Employment Act40 involved in Gilmer.41
35 See infra Part IV.C.
36 Gregory E. Zimmerman, Comment: The Teamster Joint Grievance Committee and
NLRB Deferral Policy: A Failure to Protect the Individual Employee's Statutory Rights, 133
U. PA. L. REv. 1453 (1985).
37 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960).
38 At least according to the Court.
39 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). The contract was
actually Gilmer's form registration as a securities representative.
40 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006).
41 "The Gilmer Court's interpretation of the ADEA fully applies in the collective-
bargaining context. Nothing in the law suggests a distinction between the status of
arbitration agreements signed by an individual employee and those agreed to by a union
representative." 14 Penn Plaza LLC. v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1465 (2009). This statement is
historically false. Before Pyett, the Court always distinguished the two, often explicitly. It
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This argument is little more than a pun on the word "arbitration,"
symbolizing the power of that word to confuse good minds.4 2 In truth, the mind
needs little more than command of the English language to understand the
difference between an employee agreeing to arbitrate with, not sue, his or her
employer, and a union and employer agreeing between themselves that an
individual will not sue them. Gilmer agreed to arbitrate. Pyett never did. As the
Supreme Court noted, there is "no legal basis for forcing into arbitration a party
who never agreed to put his dispute over federal law to such a process."4 3
Throughout this Article, I will follow ordinary legal usage, referring to Gilmer
arbitration, agreed to by an individual employee, as "individual contract
arbitration," and Pyett's situation, in which the only parties agreeing to arbitrate
are the union and employer, as "collective bargaining arbitration" or "labor
arbitration."
would have been far more accurate to state: "Nothing in the law before today has ever
equated arbitration agreements signed by an individual employee, which substitute for
litigation, and those agreed to by a union representative, which substitute for industrial
strife."
It is now an open question how many of these distinctions have now been effaced.
Among the more obvious: (1) arbitration agreements signed by individual employees arise
under the Federal Arbitration Act, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams., 532 U.S. 105, 111-19
(2001). This has never been held to be the case for collective bargaining agreements. (2)
Arbitration agreements signed by individual employees are employment contracts under state
law, governed by general state contract law except where the FAA preempts it as hostile to
arbitration. Collective bargaining agreements by contrast arise under federal common law
which completely preempts any application of state law. See generally Caterpillar, Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1987) (discussing difference). (3) Arbitration agreements
signed by individual employees are interpreted like ordinary contracts of employment, while
arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements cover individual claims only when
"clear and unmistakable." Wright v. Univ. Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
42 'Arbitration' is a blessed word, like 'Mesopotamia.' It tinkles pleasantly on the ear,
and suggests a quick and short route by which the terrors of the courts may be avoided in
every case. This, I am convinced, is a popular illusion, treasured in the minds of many until
put to the crucial test." Joseph Rylands, Introduction, to Roger S. Bacon, COMMERCIAL
ARBTRATION (1928), quoted (but misattributed) in Philip G. Phillips, A General
Introduction, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 119, 121 (1934).
43 Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866, 875 (1998) (quoting Miller v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, 108 F.3d 1415, 1421 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original) (union members
may sue directly in federal court for refunds of unauthorized dues assessments and need not
exhaust union's arbitration system)). The contrast between Pyett and Miller is amusing.
Union members have immediate and unmediated access to federal court to enforce rights that
the Supreme Court made up, but must arbitrate rights that Congress created.
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However, examination of the relevant labor law reveals that arbitration under
collective bargaining agreements has always been treated by the Court, and
rightly so, as something different from arbitration under other contracts. The
most important consequence of this distinction is the line of cases to be discussed
in Part II.B of this Article, which uniformly retained litigation for statutory and
common law employment rights that individual employees had not individually
consented to arbitrate.
It is, however, also worth examining the Court's earliest confrontations with
labor arbitration under collective bargaining agreements, because they illustrate
how labor arbitration has been kept distinct from other contractual arbitration.
Judicial deference to labor arbitration reflects its status as "the substitute for
industrial strife," and not a "substitute for litigation.""
Those confrontations came in the famous labor law cases known as Lincoln
Mills and the Steelworkers Trilogy, in 1957 and 1960 respectively. The Court
developed a highly deferential stance toward labor arbitration. It held that
executory promises to arbitrate would be presumptively enforceable; 45 that the
Norris-La Guardia Act was no obstacle to injunctive enforcement of the promise
to arbitrate, 46 that a presumption of arbitrability would require federal and state
courts to send even dubious claims to arbitration; 47 that state law hostile to
arbitration was preempted, 48 and that arbitrators' rulings would normally be
enforced judicially without review on the merits.49 The express basis for this
treatment, in the Court's words, was that:
.[T]he run of arbitration cases, illustrated by Wilko v. Swan, 50 ... becomes
irrelevant to our problem. There the choice is between the adjudication of cases
or controversies in courts with established procedures or even special statutory
safeguards on the one hand and the settlement of them in the more informal
4 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
45 See id. at 583.
46 Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 457-58
(1957).
47 Warrior & Gulf 363 U.S. at 584-85; United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960).
48 This was implicit in the Court's holding that the law of arbitration agreements under
Labor-Management Relations (LMRA) (Taft-Hartley) Act §301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 30 1(a), was
federal common law. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456-57. Federal preemption was made
explicit in Local 174, Teamsters, Chaukfeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Lucas
Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-04 (1962).
49 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
50 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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arbitration tribunal on the other. In the commercial case, arbitration is the
substitute for litigation. Here arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife.51
Although the federal Arbitration Act 52 was in effect at the time of the
Steelworkers Trilogy, and had been for thirty-five years, the Court did not
assume that it had any relevance to labor arbitration.53 Indeed, the Court was at
pains to establish the law of labor arbitration as distinct federal common law
under the Labor Management Relations Act.
Why was it important to establish that labor arbitration is not "the substitute
for litigation"? The Court gave two reasons.
First, the Court held, collective bargaining agreements do not vest rights in
the way that commercial contracts do. The collective bargaining agreement:
is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases
which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate.... Gaps may be left to be filled
in by reference to the practices of the particular industry and of the various
shops covered by the agreement. Many of the specific practices which underlie
the agreement may be unknown, except in hazy form, even to the negotiators. 54
In other words, a promise in a collective bargaining agreement, like Pyett's,
that the employer will not discriminate, is not fungible even with identical
language in an individual employment contract, or a statute (one might add). In a
collective bargaining agreement, unlike an individual contract or statute, any
51 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960).
52 9 U.S.C §§ 1-16 (2006).
53 In light of developments under the Federal Arbitration Act over the past forty years,
the deference given to labor arbitration in the Steelworkers Trilogy may no longer appear to
be a big deal. Today, executory promises to engage in commercial arbitration are also
enforceable, and awards judicially enforceable without review on the merits. However, this
was not the case in 1960.
The Court has never had occasion to hold whether arbitration under collective
bargaining agreements is now governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. The Steelworkers
Trilogy was premised on the idea that it was not, but, as noted, the substantive standards
have become close if not identical. Pyett did not present the issue. Neither of the parties
argued that the law under the Federal Arbitration Act would differ from the law of labor
arbitration developed under LMRA §301.
There is no prospect that the Federal Arbitration Act could supplant the law of labor
arbitration developed under LMRA § 301, since the latter, but not the former, creates federal
jurisdiction.
54 Warrior & Gulf 363 U.S. at 578-81.
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such promise takes on meaning only as part of the ongoing relationship between
the employer and union.55 Thus, under the law before Pyett, Stephen Pyett may
have had at least three sources of his right to be free of age discrimination:
(1) federal and (2) state law vested in him and enforced through litigation and (3)
his collective bargaining agreement created and controlled by his union and
employer. While all three protect him against age discrimination, they were not
fungible before Pyett. The right under the collective bargaining agreement is not
vested in Pyett as an individual; he cannot enforce it; and it means, as the Court
correctly stated in the Trilogy, just exactly what his union and his employer think
it means.
Second, the Court held in the Steelworkers Trilogy that collective bargaining
agreements are not enforced like commercial agreements. They typically provide
for enforcement by labor arbitration, which is not the same thing as commercial
arbitration. "The labor arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to the
courts .... "56 Labor arbitration "is the substitute for industrial strife."57 That is,
it covers differences between unions and employers; differences that, absent
arbitration, can and do give rise to strikes and lockouts. "There is no exception in
the 'no strike' clause and none therefore should be read into the grievance clause,
since one is the quid pro quo for the other." 58 Public policy encouraged labor
arbitration because the alternative-constant industrial conflict over the meaning
of collective bargaining agreements-was unacceptable. By contrast in "the run
of arbitration cases," 59 which in 1960 meant commercial arbitration cases,
litigation was an alternative. The inquiry was simply what means of dispute
resolution did the parties select? Courts in "the run of arbitration cases" employ
no presumption of arbitrability, and certainly do not interpret arbitration clauses
in pari materia with no-strike clauses.
The employer in Pyett thus successfully invoked the highly deferential
federal law of labor arbitration in a case that presented none of the issues that led
to that deferential law. For Stephen Pyett, arbitration is the alternative to
litigation and should have been evaluated as such. That is, his claim was a
55 That is exactly what happened to Stephen Pyett's attempt to invoke the
antidiscrimination language of his collective bargaining agreement. The union refused to
take his claim to arbitration on the grounds that, having agreed to the employer's bringing in
a new security firm, the union was precluded from complaining on behalf of incumbent
employees who lost their jobs.
56 Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 581.
57 Id. at 578.
58 United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).
59 Warrior & Gul 363 U.S. at 578.
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statutory claim that did not arise from his collective bargaining agreement.
Pushing him unwillingly into labor arbitration, which he did not select, does not
avoid industrial strife. Viewed as a "run of the mill" arbitration case, the
resolution should have been simple. Stephen Pyett, unlike plaintiffs in the Gilmer
line of individual arbitration cases, never agreed to arbitrate his federal statutory
claims.
B. Pre-Pyett Supreme Court Precedent on the Relationship Between
Collective Bargaining Arbitration and Individual Legal Rights
The modem employment relationship is undoubtedly more complex legally
than it was at the time of the Steelworkers Trilogy.60 Any employee now holds a
suite of rights of diverse origins against his or her employer. Congress has given
employees rights against their employers in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,61 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,62 the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,63 the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 199 0,6 the Family and Medical Leave Act,65 and various protection for
whistle-blowers, 66 among others. State courts, in a burst of activism in the 1980s,
developed such common law causes of action as tortious discharge in violation of
public policy,67 breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in
every contract,68 and implied contract rights. 69 Employees may have rights under
60 See generally David E. Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, 29
PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARBITRATORS 97 (1976).
61 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006).
62 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006).
63 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 is the "labor title" of ERISA.
6 42 U.S.C. §§12111-12117 are the employment provisions of the ADA; other
provisions are also relevant.
65 29 U.S.C. § 2601.
66 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, protecting whistle blowers 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
1(m); 15 U.S.C. § 7245; 18 U.S.C. § 1514A; and 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e).
67 See, e.g., Petermann v. Int'l. Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers of Am., 344 P.2d 25, 27-29 (Cal. App. 1959); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods,
Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 388-90 (Conn. 1980). Up-to-date treatment of the state law
developments discussed in these cases is available at CLYDE W. SUMMERS, KENNETH G.
DAU-SCHMIDT & ALAN HYDE, LEGAL RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN THE WORKPLACE 78-111
(2007) and statutory supplement.
68 See, e.g., Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145,1152 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.).
69 See, e.g., Scott v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 904 P.2d 834, 840-47 (Cal. 1995); Gilbert
v. Durand Glass Mfg. Co., Inc., 609 A.2d 517 (N.J. App. 1992).
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their employer's handbook,70 or oral or written promises made to them
individually.7' State legislation protects whistle-blowers and those who assert
claims under other state employment statutes, such as worker's compensation. 72
These rights, originating outside collective bargaining agreements, protect
both employees who are and are not represented by labor unions. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has held that they must protect those represented by unions
equally with those who are not.73
Thus, every employee protected by a collective bargaining agreement retains
rights, independent of that agreement, under federal and state employment law.
The argument has nevertheless been made repeatedly that unionized employees
may be forced to enforce their rights, originating independently of their collective
bargaining agreement, through labor arbitration, rather than the enforcement
70 See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1259-66 (N.J. 1985).
71 See, e.g., Rooney v. Tyson, 697 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1998); Shebar v. Sanyo Bus. Sys.
Corp., 544 A.2d 377 (N.J. 1988).
72 See, e.g., New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:19-1-19-8 (West 2000); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1102.5-1106.
73 Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994). A California statute required employers
to pay all wages owed at the time an employee is dismissed and placed responsibility for
enforcement on the Labor Commissioner. Id. at 110. The Commissioner adopted a general
policy of refusing to enforce timely payments under collective agreements, believing that the
need to interpret or apply the agreement was exclusively federal law that preempted the state
statute. Id. at 112-13. The Court unanimously rejected the Commissioner's position as
without "even a colorable argument," Id. at 124, because deciding whether a penalty should
be imposed was not a question of "contract, but [of] calendar." Id. at 124. Whether the
employer "willfully failed to pay on time" was a "question of state law, entirely independent
of any understanding embodied in the collective bargaining agreement." Livadas v.
Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 125 (1994). Nor could the Commissioner decide as a matter of
enforcement priorities to avoid unionized employees with rights under collective bargaining
agreements. A refusal by state officials to apply employment laws to employees covered by
collective bargaining agreements deprived them, under color of state law (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act. Livadas, 512 U.S. at 126-34.
Livadas vividly demonstrates how employees represented by unions (like Stephen Pyett)
retain all their individual employment rights under state and federal law, which they may
enforce through the appropriate mechanism for each right. Livadas and her union did
challenge her dismissal in labor arbitration and won her reifistatement, but chose not to
submit her claim under California wage law to arbitration. They chose to invoke state
administrative procedures, and the Court held that federal law guarantees their right to do so.
Stephen Pyett wanted exactly what Karen Livadas had a right to: the right to invoke public
processes for his public law claims, despite the existence of ongoing labor arbitration. If the
Court is correct in Pyett, then Livadas would have to be overruled.
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mechanisms created by Congress or state legislatures. 74 It has been rejected
nearly as uniformly, and should have been rejected, for at least the twelfth time,
in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett.
In the last three decades alone, the Supreme Court has decided at least
thirteen cases presenting the following pattern. An employee, currently
represented by a labor union, sues in state or federal court under a state or federal
employment statute, or state common law, and the defendant employer asserts
either that the lawsuit should be dismissed so that the employee may submit his
claim to his union for arbitration, or that the lawsuit is precluded by a previous
arbitration ruling finding against the employee.
This defense nearly always loses. In eleven of the twelve pre-Pyett cases, the
employee was permitted to sue in court, despite the existence of collective
bargaining arbitration or, in some cases, an adverse arbitration ruling. Employees
represented by labor unions may, despite collective agreements or adverse
arbitral rulings, resort to court to establish their rights under the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,75 the Fair Labor Standards Act,76 other federal wage statutes,7 7 Section
74 See infra note 73-83 and text accompanying.
75 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (holding employee may
sue employer under Title VII despite union's having taken his discharge to labor arbitration
and arbitrator finding his discharge to have been for cause).
76 Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981)
(allowing an employee to sue employer in federal court under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
seeking compensation for time spent inspecting trucks, despite collective bargaining
agreement requiring compensation for all time spent in employer's service, and adverse
ruling by joint employer-union grievance committee). The Court found it unnecessary to
resolve a factual dispute over whether the drivers had intended to submit their FLSA claim to
the grievance committee, since they "would not be precluded from bringing their action in
federal court in either case." Id. at 731 n.4. Barrentine is squarely on point:
Two aspects of national labor policy are in tension in this case. The first, reflected
in statutes governing relationships between employers and unions, encourages the
negotiation of terms and conditions of employment through the collective-bargaining
process. The second, reflected in statutes governing relationships between employers
and their individual employees, guarantees covered employees specific substantive
rights. A tension arises between these policies when the parties to a collective-
bargaining agreement make an employee's entitlement to substantive statutory rights
subject to contractual dispute-resolution procedures.
Not all disputes between an employee and his employer are suited for binding
resolution in accordance with the procedures established by collective bargaining.
While courts should defer to an arbitral decision where the employee's claim is based
on rights arising out of the collective-bargaining agreement, different considerations
apply where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of a statute designed to
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1983,78 the Federal Employers Liability Act,79 state common law contracts of
employment outside the collective bargaining agreement,80 state tort law
provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual workers.
Id. at 734-35, 737. Obviously these observations apply equally to Pyett. The Court did not
address them.
7 U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 357 (1971) (holding a seaman
may assert wage claim in federal court under the Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U. S. C. § 596,
even though he had not previously pursued arbitral remedies provided by contractual
grievance procedures); McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 357 U.S. 265,268-70
(1958) (employee returning from military service need not pursue grievance and arbitration
procedure prior to asserting seniority rights in federal court under Universal Military
Training and Service Act).
78 McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284,285 (1984) (public employee may
sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging discharge for public speech, despite ruling of labor
arbitrator that he was discharged for cause); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (upholding an individual agreement to arbitrate a discrimination claim
and distinguished Alexander, Barrentine, and McDonald, as cases in which "employees
there had not agreed to arbitrate their statutory claims . . . "). Pyett, like Alexander,
Barrentine, and McDonald, did not agree to arbitrate his statutory claims.
79 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 564 (1987). The court
held:
The fact that an injury otherwise compensable under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act was caused by conduct that may have been subject to arbitration under the
Railway Labor Act does not deprive an employee of his opportunity to bring an FELA
action for damages. . . . It is inconceivable that Congress intended that a worker who
suffered a disabling injury would be denied recovery under the FELA simply because
he might also be able to process a narrow labor grievance under the RLA to a
successful conclusion.
Id. Similarly, Pyett should not have been denied recovery under the ADEA "simply because
he might also be able to process a narrow labor grievance .... Id. at 565
80 CaterpillarInc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386,394-95 (1987). Caterpillar focused on an
employee's ability to sue in state court to enforce oral promises allegedly made to them that
contradict the collective bargaining agreement. The court stated employees may sue in
whichever forum is available:
Respondents allege that Caterpillar has entered into and breached individual
employment contracts with them. Section 301 says nothing about the content or validity
of individual employment contracts. It is true that respondents, bargaining unit
members at the time of the plant closing, possessed substantial rights under the
collective agreement, and could have brought suit under § 301. As masters of the
complaint, however, they chose not to do so.
Id. Similarly, Pyett chose not to assert any rights under the collective agreement but chose to
assert only his rights under federal statute. See also Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491
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protecting workers compensation claimants against retaliation,8 1 state statutory
and common law protection for whistle blowers, 82 and state laws requiring
timely wage payments.8 3 The underlying logic is uniform and forcefully
expressed in each case: employees as individuals hold rights that do not originate
(1983) (allowing employees to sue in state court to enforce promises allegedly made to them
to induce them to accept positions as strike replacements and allegedly breached in strike
settlement with union):
It is said that respondent replacements are employees within the bargaining unit,
that the Union is the bargaining representative of petitioner's employees, and the
replacements are thus bound by the terms of the settlement negotiated between the
employer and "their" representative.... such an argument was rejected in.. Case Co.
v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
Belknap, 463 U.S. at 491. In the latter case the employer was found to have refused to
bargain with the union, citing individual employment contracts as the excuse. The Court
upheld the Board's order that the employer discontinue the individual contracts, but
modified it "without prejudice to the assertion of any legal rights the employee may have
acquired under such contract or to any defenses thereto by the employer .... Id. at 541
n. 14. Pyett, however, unlike Hale, may not sue directly, but must be bound by the settlement
between his union and employer, which in his case was to extinguish his claim.
81 Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407-10 (1988) (permitting
employee to sue in state court alleging that her discharge was in retaliation for filing workers
compensation claim, since state law remedy is independent of the collective bargaining
agreement). In Lingle, an arbitrator had found that Lingle was discharged for cause. Under
the rule of Alexander, this did not preclude her suit in state court.
82 Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 256-63 (1994). Norris, an airplane
mechanic, was fired for refusing to certify that an aircraft was safe. The Federal Aviation
Agency agreed with Norris, proposing to fine the airline $964,000 and revoke the license of
Norris's supervisor; that case eventually settled. Norris pursued grievances under the
collective bargaining agreement, but the arbitrator upheld his discharge on the grounds that
he had been "insubordinate." The Court held unanimously that he could pursue his remedies
in state court alleging violation of a "whistle-blower" statute and tortious discharge in
violation of federal policy. The Court reviewed an unbroken line of cases dating as far back
as Mo. Pacific R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249, 258 (1931), holding that railway workers
covered by collective bargaining agreements need not submit their claims under state or
federal employment statutes to the arbitration processes of the Railway Labor Act. The Court
noted, that the principles of cases like Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, cited
supra n.62, are equally applicable to deciding both the relationship between federal statutes,
and preemption of state law. Norris, 512 U.S. at 259 n.6
83 Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994), discussed supra n.73. The one exception
to this line of cases involved an employee who simply characterized a claim for benefits,
originating under the collective bargaining agreement, as a state common law claim; this was
held preempted. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 221 (1985). This has no
relevance to Pyett's federal statutory claim.
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in collective bargaining agreements; such rights need not be submitted to labor
arbitration under those agreements; and, if submitted, adverse decisions by an
arbitrator do not preclude independent litigation.
Instead of discussing all these cases, the Court in Pyett discussed only
Alexander, Barrentine, and McDonald. It purported to distinguish them as cases
in which the arbitration clause did not cover the employee's statutory claim.84
The distinction is specious, as shown above. In all three cases there was not only
a general arbitration clause, but also an actual arbitrator's ruling that the case was
within his jurisdiction.
In other words, Alexander is not a sport or anomaly in labor law that may be
easily reversed, but a foundational brick in a now-rather-thick wall, separating
rights that belong to employees from rights that belong to their unions.85
Collective agreements never waive individual legal rights; sometimes they add to
them. But even when the collective bargaining agreement contains the same
language as a statute or individual contract, it creates a different right, for reasons
discussed in Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf rights in a collective bargaining
agreement, unlike individual rights, normally contemplate definition by
employers and unions through negotiation and arbitration. 86
Consider how collective agreements add rights. No American employee
(outside Montana) has a background default right to be discharged only for
cause. The default rule everywhere else is employment at will. Consequently,
complaints about discharge normally belong to unions that negotiate them in
collective bargaining agreements. However, the rare employee who does have
statutory or common law grounds for challenging a discharge does not lose them
just because an arbitrator has found that he or she was discharged for cause
under the collective bargaining agreement.87 By contrast, the right to get paid for
84 14 Penn Plaza LLC. v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1467-68 (2009).
85 At oral argument in Wright, Justice Scalia asked counsel for the Solicitor General to
distinguish an employee's right to be paid for his work, which Justice Scalia assumed could
only be enforced by a union, from his right to be free of discrimination, governed by
Alexander, which Justice Scalia took to be anomalous. Transcript of Oral Argument at *7,
Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv., Corp., 1998 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 84 (No. 97-889). The
answer to this question is that there is no anomaly. No legal right that is independent of the
collective bargaining agreement ever becomes extinguished because of the existence of that
agreement, or the existence of an arbitration clause, or even an adverse ruling by an
arbitrator. See, e.g., Livadas, 512 U.S. at 110; Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,
Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981).
86 See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960).87Norris, 512 U.S. at 249 (whistle blower statute); Lingle, 485 U.S. at 407 (anti-
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one's work is a common law contractual or quasi-contractual right that predates
collective bargaining.88 For most workers covered by collective bargaining
agreements, a claim for such pay involves interpretation of the agreement to an
extent that makes labor arbitration far preferable to state contract or quasi-
contract claims.89 However, the rare worker with a wage claim that does not
require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement does not waive that
claim, need not submit it to arbitration, may pursue state law remedies 90 and is
not bound by an adverse arbitral ruling.91
It is true that in none of these cases, so far as the reported decisions reveal,
was there an express clause in the relevant collective bargaining agreement
purporting to waive employee individual rights. The Court in Pyett made much
of this supposed distinction.92 Of course, in at least five cases in the sequence,
the union and employer had already arbitrated the employee's claim under the
collective bargaining agreement. All five arbitrators found the claim arbitrable
under the collective bargaining agreement and decided it adversely to the
employee on the merits. Obviously in at least those five cases there was an
arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement that covered the
employee's claim. 93 The Supreme Court held in each of these five cases that the
employee could nevertheless sue on his or her statutory or common law claim.
The Court's holdings did not assume that the claim was not arbitrable.
Arbitrators had found the claims under the collective agreement to have been
arbitrable, and that conclusion was not challenged. In holding that the employees
might nevertheless sue in court, the Court rested instead on the basic structure of
labor law, under which labor arbitration resolves disputes between unions and
employers, but does not preclude employee recourse to the courts.
More importantly, reading a collective bargaining agreement for "waiver" of
employee rights just begs the question. A purported waiver only matters if it is
retaliation statute); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-49 (1974)
(discrimination statute).
88 See, e.g., Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481, *11 (N.H. 1834) (quasi-contractual claim to
compensation for work actually done).
89 See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 221.
90 See, e.g., Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 110 (1994).
91 See, e.g., Barrentine, v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 782, 745
(1981).
92 14 Penn Plaza LLC. v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1469 (2009).
93 Alexander, 415 U.S. 36; Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 730; McDonald v. City of West
Branch Mich., 466 U.S. 284,285 (1984); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S.
399, 399 (1988); Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 249 (1994).
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assumed to deal with something waivable, which employees' individual
employment rights were not before Pyett. As the Supreme Court has noted, there
is "no legal basis for forcing into arbitration a party who never agreed to put his
dispute over federal law to such a process." 94 Searching for a waiver in a
collective bargaining agreement assumes the point at issue.95
The express negotiated waiver in Pyett's collective bargaining agreements
reflects signals from the Court, rather than constituting some kind of state of
nature. Nobody ever bothered to negotiate a waiver of employee rights in a
collective bargaining agreement, after Alexander rendered them otiose, until the
Court invited such clauses in Wright.96 Before that case, it was settled law that
arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements cover disputes between
the union and employer under that agreement, and do not, and cannot, require
employees to submit their individual statutory and common law claims to
arbitration. The Court's holding in Pyett obviously invites the increased drafting
in collective bargaining agreements of clauses purportedly directing any or all
employee claims against the employer to labor arbitration. We will discuss infra
Part IV.B whether there are any limits to this process.
94 Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866, 875 (1998).
95 Pyett's suit alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). Unlike the other federal antidiscrimination statutes, the ADEA expressly provides
for individual waivers of statutory claims. It is common for late-career employees and their
employers to negotiate terms of the employee's retirement, and employers normally expect
that, as part of these settlements, the employee will waive any claims of age discrimination.
Lack of clarity about the standards governing these negotiated buyouts led Congress in 1990
to enact the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978
(1990), which added a new section 7(f), 29 U.S.C. § 626(f), to the ADEA. The Act permits
individual waiver of ADEA rights only if the waiver is "knowing and voluntary," and spells
out in considerable detail the steps that must be followed before such a waiver is considered
"knowing and voluntary." It must be in plain English, specifically refer to ADEA rights,
advise consultation with an attorney, and permit 21 days to consider the offer and 7 days
opportunity to revoke consent. It also provides that settlement of an action filed in court by
the individual or the individual's representative, alleging age discrimination .. .may not be
considered knowing and voluntary "unless at a minimum" these procedural steps are
followed. Id. The Pyett decision makes no reference to Congress's standards for waiver of
ADEA claims and permits unions to waive ADEA claims in a way that employees could not
do for themselves. I owe this point to Samuel Davenport.
96 Wright v. Universal Mar.Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 78-82 (1998) found that a generic
collectively-bargained arbitration clause providing for arbitration of "[m]atters under
dispute" did not waive employees' right to sue under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
but expressly reserved whether an arbitration clause, clearly encompassing statutory
discrimination claims, might call for different treatment.
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Any employee, of course, can agree individually to any kind of arbitration.9 7
But a union and employer, both potential defendants in discrimination suits,
could not, before Pyett, agree between them to have an arbitrator (paid by them)
decide whether I gave them my car.
A union and employer agree to an arbitration clause to resolve their
problems, and nobody else's. This was what everybody thought before Pyett,
because it is what the Court said. 98 As two academics summarized:
A grievance arbitrator may use external statutory law as a tool for
interpreting the collective bargaining agreement. For example, an arbitrator
interpreting a contractual prohibition on race discrimination may look to law
developed under Title VII. The arbitrator at all times, however, is interpreting
and applying the contract. Thus, when an arbitrator misreads statutory law, the
apparent errors in legal interpretation merge with the arbitrator's interpretation
of the contract. Because the parties have agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's
interpretation of the contract, they still get what they bargained for and a court
should not release them from their bargain. There is no adverse effect on public
values because the employee's statutory claim is distinct from the grievance
and may still be pursued in court.99
The Supreme Court relied on arguments of this type in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver.10 0
97 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 482 (1987); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20 (1991); Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). For descriptions of these
cases, see supra note 9.
98 See infra notes 75-83 and text accompanying.
99 Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Litigationfrom the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1205 (1993) (footnotes omitted, emphasis added). This is why an
employer violates the duty to bargain in good faith by insisting on a waiver clause under
which an employee who files a charge with a federal or state agency waives his right to
submit a contractual grievance. As explained in the individual opinion of Chairman
Stephens, this would be giving the employee the right to preempt the union's right to bargain
in its own name about statutory claims. Kolman/Athey Div. of Athey Prods. Corp. and Allied
Indus. Workers of Am., 303 N.L.R.B. 92, 92-94 (1991). Applying the bundle-of-sticks
again: an employee's statutory right to be free of discrimination is not fungible with the
union's interest, and neither pre-empts the other. Under this settled labor law, the arbitration
clause in Stephen Pyett's collective bargaining agreement was an enforceable promise
between union and employer to arbitrate their differences about possible discriminatory
work practices. It did not, and could not, affect Pyett's statutory rights.
100 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52-53 (1974).
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IV. THE ISSUES ARISING AFTER PYETT
The Pyett decision thus invents a question-begging concept of union waiver
of employee individual statutory rights; treats labor arbitration as fungible with
commercial arbitration; calls for unprecedentedly close reading of arbitration
clauses in collective agreements; and puts into question numerous Supreme
Court labor cases. The opinion is unclear whether it is to be read broadly, as a
major rethinking of the role and nature of labor arbitration set out in the
Steelworkers Trilogy, or narrowly, containing limits that do not appear in the
opinion. As we shall see, the initial set of post-Pyett decisions in federal district
court replicate this confusion
These uncertainties will be confronted in numerous cases raising the
following issues which we will now discuss, in the following order. First, the
pre-arbitration phase: employee sues employer in federal or state court.
Defendants seek dismissal on the grounds that the employee should have resorted
to labor arbitration.
(A) Must the employee's rights be specifically waived in the union
contract? Will a blanket waiver of all employee claims be effective? Will
courts employ the traditional presumption of arbitrability?
(B) Does the duty to bargain in good faith place any limits on
employer's ability to insist to impasse on waivers of employee lawsuits, or
on union insistence on clauses preserving employee lawsuits?
"[A] contractual right to submit a claim to arbitration is not displaced simply
because Congress also has provided a statutory right against discrimination. Both rights
have legally independent origins and are equally available to the aggrieved employee.
This point becomes apparent through consideration of the role of the arbitrator in the
system of industrial self-government. As the proctor of the bargain, the arbitrator's task
is to effectuate the intent of the parties. His source of authority is the collective-
bargaining agreement, and he must interpret and apply that agreement in accordance
with the 'industrial common law of the shop' and the various needs and desires of the
parties. The arbitrator, however, has no general authority to invoke public laws that
conflict with the bargain between the parties: 'An arbitrator is confined to interpretation
and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his
own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources,
yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this
obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.'
Id. (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960)).
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(C) Are there employee rights that cannot be waived and diverted by
the union to labor arbitration?
(D) Even where the labor arbitration clause clearly covers the
employee's claim, will there be cases in which district courts find it a
waste of time to dismiss the claim pending labor arbitration that, for
example, will either never happen or be flawed if it does?
The second set of issues will arise after the employee loses in arbitration and
returns to federal court, again accusing the employer of discrimination or other
violations of employee rights; now offering the arbitration decision as additional
evidence of this very hostility to rights; and now accusing the union of a breach
of the duty of fair representation.
(E) Will it be necessary to allege breach of the union's duty of fair
representation in order to lift the bar of finality of the arbitral ruling? If so,
what standard will be used to evaluate whether the union has breached
this duty?
(F) What standard will be employed for review of the arbitrator's
decision on the statutory issue? Will the arbitrator be entitled to the
traditional deference to his or her decision on the merits, developed when
the arbitrator's ruling was the substitute for "industrial strife," not the
substitute for "litigation"? or will the statutory claim be understood as
calling for a more searching review of the arbitrator's legal analysis? Will
it matter whether the arbitrator is a lawyer or made any attempt to apply
the law of discrimination?
(G) Will such non-arbitration institutions of grievance processing,
such as joint grievance committees, be entitled to the same respect as
arbitration?
None of these questions has an obvious answer. Their answers will emerge
in the litigation that will be encouraged by the Court's decision in Pyett.
A. Which Arbitration Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements
Will Effectively Prevent Employees from Suing on Individual
Claims?
As mentioned, the biggest uncertainty created by Pyett, from which most of
the other uncertainties stem, is its lack of fit with traditional rules for interpreting
arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements.
Until Pyett, arbitration clauses covered everything not expressly excluded;
thus doubts were resolved in favor of inclusion. Arbitration clauses covered
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anything over which the union had agreed not to strike. These principles applied
if the union wanted to arbitrate a dispute while the employer resisted,10' and
equally if the employer sought an injunction against a strike because the union
passed up a chance to arbitrate the underlying strike demand.102 Under this
presumption of arbitrability, not overruled in Pyett, arbitrators in earlier cases
like Alexander, Barrentine, McDonald, Lingle, and Norris,103 concluded that
general arbitration clauses permitted them to arbitrate discipline or discharge of
employees who claimed to have been discharged in violation of federal or state
employment law. When those cases reached the Supreme Court, the Court did
not (at that time) challenge the arbitrator's ability to rule on the discipline, thus
settling the union's claim against the employer. The Court held, rather uniformly
that these arbitral rulings did not preclude subsequent employee suit on the
statutory claim.104
In order not to overrule these cases, the first three of which the Court
mentioned by name, Pyett distinguished them as cases in which the arbitration
clause in the collective agreement made no specific reference to employee
statutory claims. This is a puzzling distinction, because for other legal purposes,
general arbitration clauses like those in Alexander, Barrentine, McDonald,
Lingle, and Norris are agreements to arbitrate issues affecting employees. This is
true, for example, if the union seeks an order requiring a reluctant employer to
arbitrate, or if the employer seeks an injunction against a strike.
The question thus arises whether the novel Pyett approach to construing
arbitration clauses (close parsing of language; no presumption of arbitrability)
can co-exist with the traditional Warrior & Gulf approach (everything not
expressly excluded is arbitrable, and even exclusions are narrowly read).
There are obviously several ways in which this anomaly may be resolved in
future years, and we can anticipate lower court decisions adopting the entire
range of positions until the matter is resolved by the Supreme Court or Congress.
Some courts will understand Pyett as a disapproval of Warrior & Gulf and
101 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960), United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584 (1960).
102 Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770,398 U.S. 235,253 (1970), made
available such injunctions, against strikes over arbitrable issues, as a partial exception to the
Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § § 101 et seq. See also Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 385-88 (1974) (enjoining strike in protest of employer
reinstatement of two foremen indicted for falsifying safety reports), made clear that the
presumption of arbitrability would apply in Boys Market suits.
103 Supra, Section lU.B.
104 Supra, Section lf.B.
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Gateway Coal, and begin closely scrutinizing the text of all arbitration clauses, in
all contexts, to see whether the particular dispute is included. 05 Unions will be
denied orders to arbitrate because courts will read general arbitration clauses as
lacking a specific commitment to arbitrate the particular dispute that has arisen,
thus effectively reversing Warrior & Gulf
A second group will maintain the presumption of arbitrability and extend it
to individual suits, like Pyett. This will mean overruling Alexander, Barrentine,
McDonald, Lingle, and Norris. That is, they will dismiss any lawsuit brought by
an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement with a general
arbitration clause. These courts will employ the presumption of arbitrability, hold
that the general arbitration clause waived the employee's statutory rights, and
dismiss the employee's suit.
A third group will preserve the presumption of arbitrability in the order-to-
arbitrate (Warrior & Gulf) and strike injunction (Gateway Coal) situations, but
not in the employer-motion-to-dismiss-employee statutory claim context. This
will preserve the maximum number of precedents. However, since this
distinction is both unprecedented and unprincipled, it is impossible to predict
how it will be employed.
Consider an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement
purporting to waive any and all employee legal claims of any nature and instead
requires the union to arbitrate these claims with the employer. In light of Pyett,
some employers will now seek such clauses, and unions will agree to them for
the right price. I see no distinction between this clause and the clause in Pyett,
because I believe that the presumption of arbitrability still applies. Doubtless,
however, some court will find a blanket waiver of this kind not "clear and
unmistakable." 06 Perhaps courts will make distinctions between waivable and
unwaivable employee rights. It will be said that Pyett's right to be free of age
discrimination was shared with other employees, hence waivable by his union;
while his right to be paid for his work was "individual" and thus not waivable.
105 See, e.g., Shipkevich v. Staten IslandUniv. Hosp., No. 08-cv-1008,2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 51011, *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2009) (holding a collective agreement forbidding
discrimination and containing general arbitration clause does not waive employee's right to
sue); Catrino v. Town of Ocean City, No. WMN-09-505, 2009 US Dist LEXIS 59783, *10
(D. Md. July 14, 2009).
106 Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 82 (1998) held that a generic
collectively-bargained arbitration clause providing for arbitration of "[m]atters under
dispute" did not waive employees' right to sue under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
but expressly reserved whether an arbitration clause, clearly encompassing statutory
discrimination claims, might call for different treatment.
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There is no solution to this problem that does not involve overruling some
Supreme Court precedent. My preference would be to overrule Pyett, retain the
presumption of arbitrability in all contexts, but limit the preclusive effect of
arbitral awards to the union and employer. However, as Pyett was just decided,
this is politically unlikely.
B. Does the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith Place Any Limits on
Employer Ability to Insist to Impasse on Waivers of Employee
Lawsuits, or on Union Insistence on Clauses Preserving Employee
Lawsuits?
A different group of issues will arise as employers demand that unions agree
to broad waiver clauses, waiving individual employees' rights to litigate legal
claims. Unions may instead propose language guaranteeing employees the
individual right to litigate individual claims. Analysis of clauses of this type
creates difficult issues under sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) of the National Labor
Relations Act, obligating employers and unions to bargain in good faith, which
the National Labor Relations Board has long interpreted as authorizing it to
regulate the subjects of the bargaining process and the kinds of pressure that may
be used pursuing particular demands.
There is no general objection to individual bargaining coexisting with
collective bargaining, and some is entailed by the "bundle of sticks" theory of
employee legal rights. In industries like entertainment and sports, individual
contracts have long coexisted with collective bargaining agreements. 0 7 An
employer whose employees are represented by a union normally commits an
unfair labor practice by negotiating directly with those employees without having
obtained the union's consent.108 However, if the union consents to individual
negotiations, over individual arbitration or anything else, the employer may
conduct them.109 To date, demands for "individual contracts" have come from
107 See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 234-35 (1996) (collective
negotiations followed by employer implementation of new salary); H.A. Artists & Assocs.,
Inc. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 713-23 (1981) (collective bargaining agreement
with theatrical producers, and mandatory terms in individual contracts between actors and
agents).
108 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1944) (holding
employer violates duty to bargain in good faith by directly negotiating wage increase with
individual employees represented by a union).
109 If the union does not agree to permit the employer to negotiate individual arbitration
clauses, the employer has other options. The legal analysis of these is somewhat uncertain.
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employers and been resisted by unions. After Pyett, with the world upside-down,
employers will demand that unions agree to submit all employee legal claims
whatsoever to arbitration, while some unions will insist that employees hold
some legal claims as individuals, meaning the employer must deal with them as
They were not before the Court in Pyett.
The Board has not decided whether a clause permitting individual negotiations with
employees over statutory rights is a mandatory or permissive subject of bargaining. If it is
permissive, the employer may implement it unilaterally. If it is mandatory, the employer may
normally implement it unilaterally after bargaining to impasse with the union. An employer
may insist on some versions of individual bargaining that substantially limit the union's role,
NLRB v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 408 (1952) (proposal exempting most
management decisions from arbitration). The Ninth Circuit and the Board have found that
there is a limit to this argument, and that an employer may not insist to impasse on a clause
that totally substitutes individual for collective bargaining. Retlaw Broad. Co., 324 N.L.R.B.
138 (1997), enforced Retlaw Broad. Co. v. NLRB 172 F.3d 660, 664-65 (9th Cir. 1999).
The Board has found a third, intermediate possibility: proposals that may be bargained
to impasse but may not be implemented unilaterally. An employer bargained to impasse over
its proposal to substitute individual pay determinations in place of contractual wages. The
Board held that the employer could not unilaterally implement this proposal, even after
impasse, because of its potentially destructive impact on collective bargaining. McClatchy
Newspapers, 321 N.L.R.B. 1386, 1388 (1996), enforced McClatchyNewspapers v.NLRB,
131 F.3d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied 524 U.S. 937 (1998). Courts of appeals have,
distinguishing McClatchy, permitted unilateral implementation, after impasse, of wage
criteria limiting employer discretion. Edward S. Quirk Co. v. NLRB, 241 F.3d 41, 43-44 (1st
Cir. 2001); Detroit Typographical Union No. 18 v. NLRB, 216 F.3d 109, 118 (D.C. Cir.
2000).
Suppose now, after Pyett, that an employer proposes that the union agree to let it impose
agreements on individual employees in which each would waive any litigation against the
employer and agree instead to arbitration. Suppose the union does not agree. And suppose
the employer imposes this term unilaterally. The union might file refusal-to-bargain charges
with the NLRB. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 8(a) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5)
(2006). The Board would have to decide whether the employer's proposal was a permissive
subject of bargaining; or, if mandatory, whether an impasse had been reached permitting
unilateral imposition by the employer; or whether such individual bargaining was so
destructive of collective bargaining that it demonstrated bad faith absent actual union
consent. The outcome of this analysis is not easy to predict. For one attempt, see Ann
Hodges, Arbitration ofStatutory Claims in the Unionized Workplace: Is Bargaining with the
Union Required?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 513 (2001).
I have noted elsewhere my lack of sympathy for the entire Board apparatus of
mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining, which, as this example indicates, often
encourages brinkmanship and discourages negotiations. Alan Hyde, The Story of First
National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB: Eliminating Bargaining for Low-Wage Service
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individuals. Much as one might hope that the Board refrains from deciding that
any of these demands is bad faith bargaining, it is likely instead to regulate the
area.
C. Are There Any Employee Rights that Cannot Be Waived by Unions
into Labor Arbitration?
The Court's analysis in Pyett makes no specific reference to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, except to its nonexistent language said to
favor arbitration, language the Court found in other antidiscrimination statutes
and pretended was part of the Age Discrimination Act as well. Obviously unions
may thus waive employee claims under other discrimination statutes such as Title
VII. Whether they may waive claims under federal statutes requiring
compensation for injury depends on the continuing force of cases such as
Buell.1 10 The application of Pyett to the Americans with Disabilities Act, and to
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, is particularly difficult.
1. The Americans with Disabilities Act Under Labor Arbitration
The application of Pyett to employee claims under the Americans with
Disabilities Act will be particularly unfortunate. A claim of discrimination under
the Americans with Disabilities Act'II has a different structure than other
discrimination claims. It starts with a highly individualized inquiry into whether
the employee (or other plaintiff) is "disabled." This involves more than a medical
diagnosis; in each case the trier of fact must determine whether this individual's
impairment "substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual." 1 2 This inquiry, made individually, normally examines everyday
110 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 564 (1987) ("The fact that
an injury otherwise compensable under the Federal Employer's Liability Act was caused by
conduct that may have been subject to arbitration under the Railway Labor Act does not
deprive an employee of his opportunity to bring an FELA action for damages.... It is
inconceivable that Congress intended that a worker who suffered a disabling injury would be
denied recovery under the FELA simply because he might also be able to process a narrow
labor grievance under the RLA to a successful conclusion.").
Ill Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006),
amended by Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, P.L. 110-325, 122
Stat. 3553 (2008).
112 ADA § 3(1) (A).
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tasks which vary among employees, not work tasks common amongst them. 113
An employee who is found disabled proposes some way the employer might
"reasonably accommodate" her disability.114 While the employer is not obligated
to accept the employee's proposal, it must normally engage in an "interactive
process" with that employee,'' 5 until either a reasonable accommodation is
discovered, or can be shown not to exist without "undue hardship" to the
employer." 6 The result may, unlike other discrimination statutes, directly
obligate employers to spend money accommodating individual employees, 117
money that, although the point is not uncontroversial, probably typically is
redistributed from the majority of employees to the disabled individual." 8
It is hard to think of a legal obligation less suitable for labor arbitration. The
usual economic analysis of labor unions is that they readjust the signals and
incentives of employers away from the marginal worker toward the median
worker." 9 Unions' organization, legal privileges, and legal obligations both
113 ADA § 3(2) (defining "major life activities").
114 ADA § 102(b) (5) (A) (defining "not making reasonable accommodations" as
statutory discrimination).
115 US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 407 (2002) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Canny v. Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Bottling Group, Inc., 439 F.3d 894, 902-03 (8th Cir. 2006);
29 C.F.R. Part 1630 App., § 1630.9
116 ADA § 102(b) (5) (A) (providing that the employer is not required to make
otherwise reasonable accommodations if it "can demonstrate that the accommodations would
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business .... ).
117 Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can
Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79
N.C. L. REV. 307 (2001); Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L. Willborn, Reasonable
Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM.& MARY L. REv. 1197 (2003).
118 See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination andAccommodation, 115 HARv. L. REv. 642
(2001); Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REv. 223 (2000); Sharon
Rabin-Margalioth, Cross-Employee Redistribution Effects ofMandatedEmployee Benefits,
20 HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 311 (2003); Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, Anti-Discrimination,
Accommodation, and Universal Mandates: Aren't They All the Same?, 26 BERK. J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 111 (2003). These authors offer different models, but under each, costs imposed by
accommodation mandates, such as the duty to reasonably accommodate the disabled, are
borne largely by fellow employees.
'
1 9 RIcHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? 6-12 (1984);
Richard B. Freeman, What Do Unions Do?-The 2004 M-Brane Stringtwister Edition, 26 J.
LAB. RES. 641 (2005) (updating book in light of twenty years' research, but not revising this
conclusion). The standard economic critique of unions does not challenge the claim of
redirection of incentives from the marginal to the median worker; it argues that more
workers lose than benefit from the redistribution toward the median.
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reflect and reinforce this obligation toward the median worker.120 Unions have
no history or competence of preparing presentations to show that a given
employee is "disabled" in the legal sense, that is, suffers in daily life from the
effects of a diagnosed impairment, though such presentations are normal for the
plaintiffs personal injury lawyer. Unions have no expertise in developing
particular applications of the concept of reasonable accommodation. Most
importantly, unions are in flat conflict of interest in negotiating reasonable
accommodation for an individual that, in many or most cases, will be paid by
other employees. It simply defies belief to assume that Congress-which only six
months before the Pyett decision expanded the Americans with Disabilities Act
to overcome restrictive interpretations by the Supreme Court' 21-meant to grant
disabled employees only such accommodation as their co-workers choose to pay,
as opposed to Congress's more sweeping definition. 122
120 For example, an employer's obligation to bargain with a union is limited to subjects
described as "bringing a problem of vital concern to labor and management within the
framework established by Congress as most conducive to industrial peace." Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964) (quoted in First Nat'l, Maint. Corp. v.
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, (1981) (not subjects of interest only to small minorities of
employees)). See Allied Chem. and Alkali Workers Local 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U.S. 157, 172-73 (1971) (holding an employer was not required to bargain with union
over changes in benefits to already-retired employees; they lack the mutuality of interest
which "serves to assure the coherence among employees necessary for efficient collective
bargaining and at the same time to prevent a functionally distinct minority group of
employees from being submerged in an overly large unit."). Unions must observe democratic
procedures designed to ensure responsiveness to the will of the majority. Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 401-531 (2006).
121 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006),
amended by Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, P.L. 110-325, 122
Stat. 3553 (2008).
122 ADA § 101(9) notes:
The term "reasonable accommodation" may include (A) making existing facilities
used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.
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2. ERISA
Even more absurd, if possible, will be the application of Pyett to employee
claims under ERISA. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act was
enacted in 1974 precisely to control the employers and unions, who, after Pyett,
will now judge their own conduct in labor arbitration.
Well-publicized incidents revealed how precarious most employees' claims
were to their pensions before ERISA.123 Employer promises of pensions were
often unenforceable at common law, and equitable principles of trusts had not
prevented pension plans that were underfunded, mismanaged, or looted by
corrupt managers or union leaders. 124 ERISA makes pension benefits
nonforfeitable. 125 While enforcement is complex and involves federal officials,
123 MICHAEL S. GORDON, SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, THE EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURrrY ACT OF 1974: THE FIRST DECADE 6-25 (1984), reprinted in
JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET. AL, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAw 83-93 (5th ed., 2010)
[hereinafter GORDON, ERISA, THE FIRST DECADE]; JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURrrY ACT OF 1974: A POLICAL HISTORY (2004).
124 As reported in Gordon's history:
Except for restrictions on plan investments in a plan sponsor's securities, the
President's [1965] committee report had virtually dismissed out-of-hand the need for
Federal fiduciary standards for private plans. In the same year that the report was
released, however, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, a unit of the
Senate Government Operations Committee, led by Chairman John L. McClellan,
conducted an investigation of the Allied Trade Council and Local 815 of the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, two small New Jersey unions.... [The
Subcommittee] discovered ... that one George Barasch, the founder of the two New
Jersey unions involved, had managed to manipulate and divert the funds of the
employee benefits plans connected with the unions in such a way as to make himself a
prospective multimillionaire. Among other things, Barasch, who was a trustee of the
plans, had set up a commercial benefit consulting organization which virtually ran the
plans and collected huge consulting fees for the benefit of Barasch. At the time of the
McClellan investigation, Barasch was in the process of liquidating the two benefit
funds and transferring $4 million of their assets to two so-called charitable
corporations, established in Liberia and Puerto Rico, of which Barasch was the
organizer and principal shareholder. McClellan's committee was told by executive
branch representatives that all of the foregoing could not be prevented under existing
laws. This testimony so dismayed Senator Jacob K. Javits, a member of the Government
Operations Committee, that within less than 2 weeks after the committee had concluded
the Barasch investigation, he introduced the first bill to impose fiduciary standards on
employee benefit funds.
GORDON, ERISA, THE FIRST DECADE, supra note 123, at 87.
125 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053
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employees participating in plans may sue to enforce their rights to benefits or to
correct failings of fiduciaries.126
While ERISA covers employees who are, and are not, represented by unions,
the most heavily regulated plan is the defined benefit plan which in practice is
found primarily among employees covered by collective bargaining
agreements.127 A defined benefit plan promises employees a fixed amount (often
expressed as a percentage of their final paycheck) on retirement. Sponsoring
employers are legally obligated to pay that amount, regardless whether there are
sufficient funds in the plan. Defined-benefit plans thus necessitate a trust,
holding sufficient assets to pay anticipated claims that must be funded
adequately.128 The existence of these assets under the control of plan managers,
typically corporate officers and sometimes union leaders, creates temptations that
ERISA tries to deter. Managers are fiduciaries charged with various specific and
general obligations of prudence and diversification.129
Following Pyett, arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements will
soon require employees to arbitrate through unions and employers, rather than
litigate, any claims they might have to retirement benefits, or complaints about
breaches of fiduciary obligation. Perhaps not all collective bargaining agreements
will adopt such language. However, corrupt unions and employers that
necessitated ERISA protection for employee pensions will adopt these arbitration
clauses. For example, as late as twenty-five years after the adoption of ERISA,
Teamsters Local 815 was controlled by the very same Barasch interests whose
corruption is said to have led Sen. Javits to include fiduciary standards in the
legislation.130 Teamsters Local 815, and the employers with which it negotiates,
(2006).
126 ERISA § 502; see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 1075 (1996) (individual
relief for fiduciary violations).
127 Sixty-nine percent of union workers in the private sector have access to defined
benefit pension plans, while only fifteen percent of nonunion workers do. U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICs, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY:
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, 2007, available at
http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebsm0006.pdf, Tbl. 1, at 7.
128 ERISA § 302.
129 ERISA § 404.
130 One reporter writes:
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters has taken control of its Englewood
Cliffs local and removed two union leaders accused of defrauding it of $144,000.
Teamster President James Hoffa placed Local 815 in trusteeship....
The children of founder George Barasch are administrators of the local's affiliated
benefit funds, and in 1997 companies the children owned were paid over $2 million
1009
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
will be certain to negotiate arbitration clauses requiring employees to arbitrate
their claims against the pension plan.
It defies belief that Congress would have created its detailed regulation of
defined benefit plans, plans that, in practice, enroll almost exclusively employees
represented by unions, only to turn that regulation over to arbitration controlled
by the subjects of regulation. It equally defies belief that Congress intended to
leave an employee, whose pension was frittered away by inept or corrupt
decisions by his employer or union, to their mercies in determining when plans
are adequately administered or fiduciary obligations fulfilled.
It is one thing to remove employees covered by collective bargaining
agreements from the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. While, we have
argued, incorrect, this decision will affect only those employees. Since only 7.2%
of private sector employees are represented by a union, 131 the overall course of
age discrimination law will not be greatly affected if union representees have no
access to courts. It is something else again to take a detailed body of regulation,
applying only or primarily to employees under collective bargaining agreements,
out of the federal courts where Congress placed it, and into the arms of an
arbitration system created and controlled in some casesby the very unions and
employers (and individuals) who created the problem.
D. Are There Situations in Which a Labor Arbitration Clause Covers
a Particular Employee Claim but the Federal Court May Hear
the Claim Anyway?
from four of the affiliated funds. For 20 years, the founder has been leasing the local its
offices . .. under an agreement that requires the local to pay rent and 40% of the
landlord's taxes, utilities, maintenance, and fire insurance costs....
The local entered into at least three "sham" collective bargaining agreements with
companies owned by union members; held only eight membership meetings since 1994
instead of monthly as required, and has not had a contested election for 25 years....
The allegations involving Barasch and his children are similar to those lodged 35
years ago. In 1965, Barasch was called before a U.S. Senate subcommittee investigating
allegations that $4 million in union funds had been transferred to foundations affiliated
with him or his relatives. He invoked his 5th Amendment right against self-
incrimination.
Louis LaVelle, 2 Leaders of Union in Cliffs Ousted, RECORD (Bergen Co., N.J.), Dec. 29,
1999 at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, News & Business, Individual Publications,
The Record (Bergen Co., N.J.).
131 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNION MEMBERs-2009, USDL-10-0069 (Jan. 22,
2010), available at http://stats.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf
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An exception to Pyett has already been recognized when the union refused to
invoke arbitration. The court held that in that case the employee might proceed
directly to court without having to prove that the refusal was a breach of the
union's duty of fair representation (discussed supra, Section L.E).132 I predict
that other exceptions to Pyett will be recognized in cases where the facts
similarly make labor arbitration an unappealing prospect. Perhaps plaintiffs
allegations of racial or sexual hostility from both employer and union will ring
true, so that dismissing her claim and requiring her adversaries to arbitrate it will
seem a waste of time (since the case will be coming back anyway after the
arbitration). Some federal judges will send even such a case to arbitration. The
empirical legal scholars report unusually high rates of dismissal of discrimination
cases. 133 Others, however, will be troubled. They will create an exception to
Pyett for cases where arbitration is unappealing.
Such cases will be highly fact-specific and resistant to generalization. They
will point out the weak theoretical basis of Pyett's insistence that unions can
negotiate whatever they please for the workers they represent; so why not waive
all their rights to sue? Earlier cases, such as Barrentine,134 were more thoughtful
in understanding that there are, at least, countervailing values when private
bargaining purports to destroy public claims. These difficult issues will not go
away just because Pyett ignores them.
Discrimination plaintiffs represented by unions will thus, despite Pyett,
continue to sue directly in federal court, alleging that the history of
discrimination by employer and union makes it more appropriate for the federal
court to hear the case rather than requiring useless arbitration. Federal courts will
divide on how to evaluate these claims. Some will insist that Pyett requires
dismissal. Others will develop three-part balancing tests in which they weigh the
plaintiff s likely success on the merits against the public and private interest in an
arbitral first look. Others will develop different balancing tests. The Supreme
Court will eventually rule on this class of exceptions to Pyett, and its decision
will, perhaps, clarify the applicable standard.
132 Kravar v. Triangle Serv., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42944 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
133 Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice: Litigating Claims of Employment
Discrimination in the Contemporary United States, AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH PAPER 08-
04, 2008) (low rate of plaintiff success; no correlation between EEOC evaluation of
complaint and judicial outcome); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How
Employment Discrimination Plaintifs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 429
(2004) (lowest win rate of any class of plaintiffs in both federal district and appeals courts).
134 See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 731 n.4 (1981);
see also supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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E. After the Employee Loses the Arbitration, Will She Have to Allege
Breach of the Union's Duty ofFair Representation to Get a Court
to Look at Her Discrimination Case?
We know, roughly, the circumstances on which an employee who loses an
arbitration on a claim under the collective bargaining agreement can get a court
to set aside that award. If Pyett concerned only claims under the collective
bargaining agreement, it would work to make most, but not all, arbitrations final
and binding on federal courts. Of course, Pyett concerned a statutory claim, not a
claim made by an employee under a collective bargaining agreement, so that will
add new uncertainty to an already uncertain area of law.
But let us start with the known case: employee complains her employer
violated the collective bargaining agreement, but the union either refuses to take
the case to arbitration, or takes it to arbitration and loses. In either case, the
employee may sue to enforce her rights under the collective agreement only by
alleging that the union has violated its duty of fair representation. 135 Proof of
such a violation by the union also removes the arbitration award as a bar of
finality on a claim against the employer.136 Proving a breach of the duty of fair
representation requires plaintiff to demonstrate union conduct leading to the loss
of the grievance that was "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." 37
While this much is uncontroversial, this formula has proven incapable of
generating consistent results. Co-authors and I reviewed cases involving the duty
of fair representation recently in a casebook, and I do not propose to do so again
here.138 Briefly, the same factual patterns are litigated over and over again and
there is no way of reconciling the outcomes. A common pattern involves the
union representative's physically losing the employee's grievance and missing
the filing deadline. Cases sometimes find this "arbitrary."139 The Supreme
135 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190-95 (1967).
136 Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 567-72 (1976).
137 Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190.
138 SUMMERS et. al., supra note 66, at 681-87.
139 Compare, e.g, Foust v. Int'l. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 572 F.2d 710 (10th Cir.
1978) (late filing is breach of duty of fair representation), cert. denied on this issue 439
U.S. 892 (1978), with Steamfitters Local 342, 336 N.L.R.B. 549 (2001)(negligence is not
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Court's most recent decision on the duty of fair representation comprised an
avalanche of metaphors. 140
Cases following Pyett will put this rickety structure under severe, if not fatal,
pressure. Some unquantifiable, probably large, number of discrimination and
other statutory claims by union employees will be diverted to the grievance
process. Unions are not ready to handle this. Unions are beleaguered and can
hardly maintain competent levels of processing grievances limited to violations
of collective bargaining agreements. Union negligence, sometimes hostility, will
lose many potentially meritorious claims of discrimination. Some courts,
probably most, will apply the Vaca formulation ("arbitrary, discriminatory, or in
bad faith") strictly, and refuse to let plaintiffs revive discrimination cases lost
through union carelessness. Others will try to cabin the Vaca formulation within
the law of collective agreements, and develop new, more generous tests for
lifting the bar of arbitration of statutory claims. The Supreme Court will
eventually have to resolve the question of defining fair representation of statutory
claims.
One possibility is that union refusals to arbitrate will not be analyzed as
potential breaches of the duty of fair representation. Rather, Pyett may be read to
give the union only an option to arbitrate. Should the union decide not to take an
employee's claim to arbitration, this would simply reinstate the employee's
discrimination suit. Justice Souter, dissenting in Pyett, suggested this result. 141 A
district court has applied this, refusing to dismiss a discrimination suit under the
same collective agreement involved in Pyett, because the union refused to
arbitrate the employee's discrimination claim.142 This theory is not easy to square
with the facts of Pyett, in which the union similarly refused to arbitrate Mr.
Pyett's claim. This theory will open up the question of when to apply either of
the two standards for evaluating union refusals to arbitrate: when such a refusal
140 Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65 (1991). In O'Neill, the court
found union agreement to a particular strike settlement not to be in breach of its duty of fair
representation, analogized the union to a fiduciary, trustee, attorney with a client, corporate
officer or director, and legislature; it also pointed out through litotes that the settlement "was
by no means irrational.... [and] ... was certainly not illogical." Id. at 79. Anyone can find
a legal standard to like on this list.
141 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct 1456, 1481 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("On
one level, the majority opinion may have little effect, for it explicitly reserves the question
whether a CBA's waiver of ajudicial forum is enforceable when the union controls access to
and presentation of employees' claims in arbitration, which is usually the case [.]')
(citations omitted).
142 Kravar v. Triangle Serv., Inc., No. 1:06-cv-07858-RJH, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
42944 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2009).
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simply restores the claim to the employee, and when it does so only when the
union's refusal is a breach of its duty of fair representation.
What can we expect from union arbitration of statutory claims? In the
decades before Pyett, unions occasionally arbitrated statutory violations as
breaches of collective bargaining agreements, although, as noted before, these
were always, and without dissent, understood as distinct from members'
statutory claims. The results have been unimpressive. Arbitration has contributed
little or nothing to the development of the law of discrimination and other
workplace claims. In fact, there are very few studies of labor arbitration of
statutory issues.
Pauline Kim contrasted lawsuits and arbitration decisions challenging
employer drug testing. 143 Arbitrations largely challenged discipline imposed on
individual employees and did not address broader values of privacy. When
unions wished to raise privacy concerns on behalf of groups of employees, they
litigated rather than arbitrated.'" David Weil studied the implementation of
federal employment regulation in workplaces with unions. 145 The presence of a
union made inspections and compliance more likely, but certainly did not
substitute for federal regulation. Unions actively sought federal agency
enforcement of federal employment law. They did not seek to arbitrate claims
under federal employment law. 146
The deficiencies of grievance arbitration as a mode of processing
discrimination cases were noted by the Court in Alexander. Although the Pyett
court rejected these observations, for reasons it chose not to disclose, the
Alexander Court's discussion of labor arbitration is as accurate now as it was
thirty years ago. Note that it concerns, not arbitration in general, and certainly not
Gilmer arbitration between individuals and employers (which did not exist in
1974). Rather, the Court discussed in Alexander exclusively the subject of 14
Penn Plaza v. Pyett: labor arbitration under collective bargaining agreements:
Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual
disputes, make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final
resolution of rights created by Title VII. This conclusion rests first on the
special role of the arbitrator, whose task is to effectuate the intent of the parties
143 Pauline T. Kim, Collective and Individual Approaches to Protecting Employee
Privacy: The Experience with Workplace Drug Testing, 66 LA. L. REv. 1009 (2006).
144 Id.
145 David Weil, Regulating the Workplace: The Vexing Problem ofImplementation, 7
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rather than the requirements of enacted legislation. Where the collective-
bargaining agreement conflicts with Title VII, the arbitrator must follow the
agreement. To be sure, the tension between contractual and statutory objectives
may be mitigated where a collective-bargaining agreement contains provisions
facially similar to those of Title VII. But other facts may still render arbitral
processes comparatively inferior to judicial processes in the protection ofTitle
VII rights. Among these is the fact that the specialized competence of
arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land.
United Steelworkers ofAmerica v. Warrior & GulfNavigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 581-583 (1960). Parties usually choose an arbitrator because they trust his
knowledge and judgment concerning the demands and norms of industrial
relations. On the other hand, the resolution of statutory or constitutional issues
is a primary responsibility of courts, and judicial construction has proved
especially necessary with respect to Title VII, whose broad language frequently
can be given meaning only by reference to public law concepts.
Moreover, the factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to
judicial factfinding. The record of the arbitration proceedings is not as
complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures
common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-
examination, and testimony under oath, are often severely limited or
unavailable.... And as this Court has recognized, "arbitrators have no
obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award." United Steelworkers
ofAmerica v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S., at 598. Indeed, it is the
informality of arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient,
inexpensive, and expeditious means for dispute resolution. This same
characteristic, however, makes arbitration a less appropriate forum for final
resolution of Title VII issues than the federal courts. 14 7
In a footnote following, the Court commented that:
A further concern is the union's exclusive control over the manner and
extent to which an individual grievance is presented. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. 171 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). In
arbitration, as in the collective-bargaining process, the interests of the
individual employee may be subordinated to the collective interests of all
employees in the bargaining unit. See J. L Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332
(1944). Moreover, harmony of interest between the union and the individual
employee cannot always be presumed, especially where a claim of racial
discrimination is made. See, e. g., Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S.
192 (1944); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210
(1944). And a breach of the union's duty of fair representation may prove
147 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 56-58 (1974).
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difficult to establish. See Vaca v. Sipes, supra; Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S.
335, 342, 348-351 (1964). In this respect, it is noteworthy that Congress
thought it necessary to afford the protections of Title VII against unions as well
as employers. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (C).1 48
This aspect of Alexander, far from dated, is at least as relevant today as a
generation ago. None of its facts has changed. Labor arbitrators are still chosen,
by unions and employers, for their expertise in labor relations, not law. There has
been no change in arbitral practice. Labor arbitrations are conducted by unions
and employers. While some, perhaps most, unions are vigorous opponents of
employment discrimination, some still engage in the practice.149 No legal
changes have made it easier for employees to demonstrate a union breach of the
duty of fair representation.
Indeed, the Court's catalogue of weaknesses in labor arbitration as a tool
against discrimination is arguably even more relevant today than thirty years ago.
Labor arbitration has evolved in path-dependent response to cases like Alexander
and the ten similar cases discussed in Section III of this Article.150 Had
Alexander and similar cases come out differently, labor arbitration might have
evolved in unknown ways to deal better with statutory and common law claims.
Instead, as we have seen, Alexander and similar cases built a wall between labor
arbitration and legal claims not created by collective bargaining agreements. As a
result, we have no good examples of labor arbitration playing an important role
in the definition or enforcement of rights against discrimination or other
employment rights reflecting public values.151
148 Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19.
149 See, e.g., EEOC v. S.S. Clerks Union Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 814 (1995) (all-white union; requirement that new members be sponsored
by existing members had disparate racial impact). Involvement of unions in public employee
negotiations over comparable worth increases, not decreases, pay disparities between men
and women. Peter F. Orazem & J. Peter Mattila, The Implementation Process ofComparable
Worth: Winners andLosers, 98 J. POL. EcoN 134 (1990); Peter F. Orazem, J. Peter Mattila &
S. Weikum, Comparable Worth and Factor Pay Point Analysis in State Government, 31
INDUS. REL. 195 (1992).
150 See supra notes 75-83 and text accompanying.
151 For example, the innovative approaches to combating employment discrimination
surveyed in Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458,489-535 (2001), include only one unionized workforce,
clerical employees at Harvard, and no use of arbitration.
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F. Under what standard will federal courts review decisions of labor
arbitrators denying statutory claims by employees?
Following Pyett, labor arbitrators will issue decisions finding that individual
employees have not been victims of unlawful discrimination. Employees will
then sue their employer and union alleging the same discrimination. The
employer and union will offer the arbitrator's award as a bar to suit. The
employee will offer to show that the award itself, in attempting to cover up the
discrimination that the employee offers to prove, is part of the discriminatory
conduct. Under what standard will the court evaluate these claims?
Presumably if the underlying collective bargaining agreement does not
"clearly and unmistakably" waive the employee's statutory claims into
arbitration, the arbitral award is in the same posture as Alexander's and no bar to
employee suit. 152 The difficult question arises under collective bargaining
agreements that do waive employee suit; the arbitration has taken place; found
against the employee; and the employee alleges that the arbitration is part of the
discrimination. The court will have a difficult choice, and will continue to have a
choice until the Court or Congress resolves the issue.
The court might hear the discrimination case, admitting the arbitration award
only for whatever persuasive value it has. Since this is the square holding of
Alexander, and since the Court did not reverse Alexander, the district court
arguably must take this course. That is, the court will, as the Supreme Court
ordered it to do in the years before Pyett, "treat the arbitrator's award as if it
represented an agreement between [the employer] and the union as to the proper
meaning of the contract's words 'just cause."' 15 3 Pyett would then turn out to be
a case that permitted unions and employers to negotiate an arbitral "first look" at
employee statutory claims, but would not deprive employees of the ultimate right
to sue on those claims. This is the reading of Pyett that strikes me as most
respectful of precedent, particularly Alexander.
The court might treat the arbitral award as a potential bar to suit, but only if
it correctly analyzes the statutory issue. This would create tension with precedent
152 See, e.g., St. Aubin v. Unilever HPA NA, No. 09 C 1874, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
55626 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2009) (denying employer motion to dismiss); Jones v. Verizon
Commc'ns, Inc., No. 09-10525-RGS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98735 (D.Mass. Oct. 23 2009)
(same). But see Tewolde v. Owens & Minor Distrib. Inc., No. 07-4075(DSD/SRN), 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49098 (D. Minn. June 10, 2009) (according "great deference" to an arbitral
ruling without examining whether the underlying collective agreement waived the right to
individual suit).
153 E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57 (2000).
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holding that "[t]he refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is
the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements." 54
The court might treat the arbitral award as a bar to suit, unless its
enforcement would violate "public policy." This would analogize to a line of
cases, developed in rather different circumstances, on "public policy" review of
labor arbitration awards.155
The court might treat the arbitral award as a complete bar to suit, refusing to
review it on the merits. A court might reach this result by any of three paths. It
might invoke the usual refusal of courts to review labor arbitration awards on the
merits.156 Or it might decide that labor arbitration of individual statutory claims
arises under the Federal Arbitration Act, with its highly limited grounds of
review. Or the court might simply hold the award to be claim preclusive.157
154 United Steel Workers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
155 The Supreme Court has recognized the possibility of judicial nonenforcement of
labor arbitration awards that violate "public policy," but has yet to find the circumstances
warranting such nonenforcement. In all the cases in this line, an arbitrator has ordered
reinstatement of an employee after some transgression, and the employer has argued,
unsuccessfully, that "public policy" prevents enforcement of the reinstatement award. W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983); Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484
U.S. 29 (1987); E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57
(2000). In the last-named, the most recent case in the sequence, the Court was unanimous in
upholding the reinstatement award, but divided on its rationale. The Court, through Justice
Breyer, stated that an arbitral award violates public policy only when the public policy
derives from "laws and legal precedents" and is "explicit," "well defined," and "dominant."
E. Associated Coal Corp., 531 U.S. at 62-63. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas,
concurred in the result but disagreed with the Court's standard. They would deny
enforcement only to arbitral awards that violate "some positive law." Id. at 68.
Following Pyett, these concerns will arise in a different posture. Now they will be raised
by individual employees who lose arbitrations, not just by employers. And the employees'
claim will be a little different. They will claim that the arbitrator denied them their positive
legal rights, not merely that the arbitrator required them to reinstate a troubled employee.
The application of the Grace-Misco-Eastern line of cases to individual employees after
Pyett is thus somewhat conjectural. The following outcomes are all possible:
1. Admit the arbitral award only for its evidentiary value (Alexander).
2. Adhere to the arbitral award only if it correctly applied discrimination law,
rejecting review for public policy (Scalia view).
3. Adhere to the arbitral award only if it both correctly applied discrimination law and
was in no tension with public policy (Grace-Misco-Eastern).
4. Treat the arbitral award as a bar to the employee suit, overruling Alexander.
156 See generally, Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 593.
157 Mathews v. Denver Newspaper Agency, No. 07-cv-02097-WDM-KLM, 2009 U.S.
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G. Will Non-A rbitral Institutions That Deny Employee Statutory
Claims Receive the Same Deference as Arbitration?
Since labor arbitration, in the years before Pyett, settled only disputes
between unions and employers, its favorable legal treatment has been extended to
other institutions that settle disputes between unions and employers, without
regard for whether these are in any way appropriate to hear complaints of
discrimination. This question will surely come before the Court after Pyett.
The most significant substitute for arbitration is the joint grievance
committee, common in collective bargaining agreements of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters. Grievances are submitted by local union officials to
joint committees consisting of equal representation of higher level union
officials, and management representatives. If that committee deadlocks, the
grievance may be heard by higher level committees. Some Teamster collective
bargaining agreements do not include any recourse to arbitration, and in such
cases, the union may strike over accumulated grievances. Other Teamster
collective bargaining agreements permit arbitration if the highest grievance
committee deadlocks, but I am informed by a lawyer who frequently represents
Teamster dissidents that recourse to arbitration is theoretical since a deadlocked
committee at the highest level is "a very big deal, and a rarity."' 58
Joint grievance committees were developed by Teamsters President James R.
Hoffa, father of the current president, reflecting his distrust of arbitration and
preference for having multiple disputes with employers at any given time,
opening the way to swaps and compromises.1 59 The descriptions we have of the
actual work ofjoint grievance committees date from the long ago Hoffa era, but
there is no reason to assume that anything has changed. The institution is created
and designed for deal-making. In one settlement observed in 1962 by two
professors of industrial relations, the Teamsters gave approval for one company's
extensive change in operations in exchange for its pledge of cooperation with,
and dropping lawsuits against, certain locals headed by favored leaders, while
initiating a huge damage suit against a rebellious local which the leadership
"didn't have under control yet."' 60
Dist. LEXIS 37697 (D. Colo. May 4, 2009).
158 Barbara Harvey, Esq., correspondence to Alan Hyde, (March 22,2008) (on file with
author).
159 RALPH C. JAMES & EsTEuE DINERSTEIN JAMES, HOFFA AND THE TEAMSTERs: A
STUDY OF UNION POWER 167-85 (1965).
160 Id.
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Teamster joint grievance committees have nevertheless always been treated
by law as the complete functional equivalent of arbitration. They have the power
to determine a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement, and their
disposition is final against the individual grievant unless he or she can
demonstrate that the representation by the local union denied him or her "fair
representation."16 1 Some of us over the years have questioned this equivalence
and have argued that treating all provisions in a negotiated agreement as
potentially tradable in grievance processing denies those agreements the meaning
that Congress intended them to have in LMRA § 301.162 However, as the Court
has observed, "the policy of the Labor Act can be effectuated only if the means
chosen by the parties for settlement of their differences under a collective
bargaining agreement is given full play." 63
Whatever may be the deficiencies of Teamsterjoint committees, as devices
for settling union-employer conflicts and interpreting collective bargaining
agreements, pale into insignificance when one contemplates Teamster joint
committees as devices for enforcing individual employees' statutory rights. Joint
161 See generally, Gen. Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local Union 89 v. Riss &
Co., Inc., 372 U.S. 517 (1963) (holding final award of joint grievance committee is
enforceable in § 301 action); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976)
(remanding employees' claim against employer; negligent representation before joint
committee would make its award not final or binding); Bianchi v. Roadway Express, Inc.,
441 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 397 (2006) (grievant who suspects
that union representative is not providing fair representation must make that charge at the
grievance hearing or be held to have waived it); Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 461 F.3d 982
(8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2088 (2007) (applying Alexander to Teamster joint
grievance committee; award against plaintiffs is final and binding unless plaintiffs can
demonstrate breach of the duty of fair representation by union advocate; however it does not
extinguish their federal statutory claims, considered on the merits). Only the union advocate
owes the grievant a duty of fair representation. The union representatives on the joint
committee do not.
162 Clyde W. Summers, Teamster Joint Committees: Grievance Disposal Without
Adjudication, 37 PROC. NAT. ACAD. ARB. 130 (1985), reprinted in 7 INDUS. REL. L. J. 313
(1985); Zimmerman, supra, note 36; Clyde W. Summers, Harry H. Wellington & Alan Hyde,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 1197 (2d ed. 1982). Occasionally a court has raised
doubts about according this free-for-all the same respect as arbitration. Roadway Express,
Inc. v. Brock, 830 F.2d 179 (11th Cir. 1987); Taylor v. NLRB, 786 F.2d 1516 (11 th Cir.
1986); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Syst., Inc., 615 F.2d 1194, 1201 (8th Cir. 1980),
rev'd on other grounds 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Gen. Drivers & Helpers Union Local 554 v.
Young & Hay Transp. Co., 522 F.2d 562, 567 n.5 (8th Cir. 1975); Banyard v. NLRB, 505
F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
163 Riss & Co., 372 U.S. at 519 (quoting United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960) (emphasis added)).
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committees do not purport to enforce statutory rights. They are not set up to do
so. They frankly treat all individual claims as bargaining chips with which the
union can obtain settlements of greater interest to the membership at large, or the
leadership.
The Supreme Court will soon be faced with a discrimination suit by an
employee whose claim was traded away in a Teamster joint committee. 1 This
will be a difficult case to decide. The Court could distinguish its decision in
Pyett, and limit union extinction of employee statutory claims to arbitrators. This,
however, would guarantee a long and novel line of cases, testing which dispute
resolution processes would suffice, and which be inadequate, for hearing
employee statutory claims. Or the Court could adhere to its traditional position,
developed in the context of union-employer disputes, that Teamster joint
committees are in all legal ways equivalent to arbitration. This would effectively
tell employees working under Teamster agreements that they have only such
rights to be free of discrimination as the union leadership chooses to extract in
trade with management.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to think of a Supreme Court labor case of the last forty years
that will create as much uncertainty as Pyett. Pyett's impact will be felt in every
negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement, and every lawsuit brought
by an employee working under a collective bargaining agreement.
At the bargaining table, employers will propose various "waiver" clauses
under which unions agree that employees will not sue the employers over
anything but will instead submit claims to labor arbitration. The precise impact
of some of these clauses cannot be known by either side, particularly under the
Court's novel Pyett methodology of close textual scrutiny of arbitration clauses.
Unions will have to decide whether to agree to such clauses and, if so, what price
to try to extract. Thereafter, as this article has shown, Pyett will not end
individual lawsuits by employees. Indeed, it practically invites them. Courts will
struggle with which employee lawsuits to dismiss, and, after arbitrations, how to
review arbitrators' rulings and union representation. These largely procedural
wrangles will do little to advance either employee rights or industrial democracy.
Of course, it is remotely conceivable that labor arbitration will rise to the
164 E.g., Jones, 461 F.3d at 982. That case, correctly applying the pre-Pyett law of
Alexander and its progeny, kept separate the employees' claims under the collective
bargaining agreement, and their federal statutory claims. The decision of the joint committee
was final as to the contractual claim and irrelevant to the statutory claim.
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challenge and provide more effective deterrence to discrimination, and other
violations of labor rights, than it has historically. I see little evidence to suggest
that this is likely.
There are three ways of fixing Pyett. First, and least likely, the Court could,
when the occasion arises, reaffirm Alexander, which, as noted, has not been
overruled. Pyett will be understood as only a kind of exhaustion rule, novel but
limited. Employees whose unions have waived their right to sue must exhaust
labor arbitration procedures. However, they would retain their Alexander rights.
Employees could sue after the arbitration, and the arbitrator's award would be
admitted only for whatever persuasive value it has. This is possible, and I favor
it, but unlikely to occur.
Second, Congress could reverse Pyett, most likely as part of a package of
amendments to the civil rights laws, similar to the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Congress could put in legislation what it stated in committee reports: that
Alexander states the law, and employees represented by labor unions at all times
retain their individual rights under civil rights law.
Third, and most likely, state legislatures and courts could reject Pyett as to
their own antidiscrimination laws. In California and New Jersey, for example,
well-counseled plaintiffs in discrimination cases normally invoke only their
rights under those states' more generous laws.165 At least some state legislatures
will respond to Pyett by amending their antidiscrimination laws to provide that
plaintiffs need not exhaust individual or labor arbitration and that such rulings,
when issued, do not preclude court jurisdiction. At least some state courts will
construe their antidiscrimination statutes and precedents as already providing for
this. In this way, Pyett will contribute to the dissolution of federal labor law and
of the golden age of labor arbitration.
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165 As attorney Nancy Erika Smith always tells my employment law class when we are
fortunate enough to have her speak, "In New Jersey, filing a discrimination case in federal
court is malpractice per se."
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